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A Second Introduction to Formal Political Economy

Oxford · Trinity Term · 2025 and 2026

This short, optional course runs for four weeks and is offered as one of the “methods options”. It is designed as a sequel to the introductory game theory course taught during Hilary term. Its first objective is to illustrate how the concepts students learn in that course are used in the political economy literature, helping them engage more deeply and critically with modern research. The second is to develop a more nuanced understanding of the strategic rationales that underlie the existence of two institutions that characterise modern democracies, elections and interest groups.

Such an understanding is of scholarly interest and of importance for reflecting on what it means to be a good democratic citizen, both in private, when casting a vote, and in public, when choosing an occupation and making everyday decisions in jobs that are directly and indirectly related to public policymaking. My hope is that the formal demands of the models will not deter us from exploring their implications for our lived experience.

Each lecture has two parts, though these are not always presented sequentially. The first provides context on the democratic institution that the week is devoted to, or an aspect of that institution, such as accountability in elections. The second introduces one canonical political economy model from the readings, including proofs of key results. The course covers elections, party competition, electoral systems, interest groups, and democratic backsliding.

Climate policy

I worked as a teaching assistant for Christian Flachsland (Hertie School) on Advanced Climate Policy and Policy Process — Climate Policy. I made a substantial contribution to preparing and revising the lecture slides.