My DPhil manuscript and related papers examine when electoral incentives for climate action produce stringent policies that remain in place despite fluctuations in public attention and government turnover. They investigate how investment in cleaner production influences firms’ support for maintaining climate policy, how compensation affects voters’ willingness to accept its costs, and how climate laws and advisory bodies affect the climate policymaking process.
Politics Out of Time? Public Opinion Uncertainty, Producer Adjustment, and the Limits of Climate Ambition
Jacob Edenhofer
DPhil manuscript · University of Oxford · 2024–2028 (expected)
Précis
My DPhil manuscript examines how uncertainty about future electoral incentives affects the policy choices of governments and the (non-market) behaviour of producers, especially whether they resist climate policy or adjust to it. I refer to uncertainty about whether electoral incentives favouring greater stringency will persist or reverse sign as public opinion uncertainty. Policies that initially attract electoral rewards may subsequently attract electoral penalties. Such reversals can arise when preferences are weakly anchored in broader political attitudes or when the costs of policy crystallise only later (when the benefits of these policies have faded from voters’ memory) and erode support for action.
Producers assess these electoral prospects when deciding whether to make investments whose returns depend on policy remaining in place. Because producers evaluate these returns over longer time horizons than policymakers, their current decisions to adjust, defer investment, or organise opposition reflect expectations extending beyond the next election. These decisions affect the economic and political costs governments face today. Producers can therefore induce even myopic policymakers focused on winning the next election to take account of some future consequences of their policies.
I argue that strong current electoral support for climate action can coexist with limited policy ambition when producers regard that support as too fickle to justify adjustment. Their decisions to defer investment or sustain organised opposition can increase the economic and political costs governments currently face. Expectations of future electoral hostility can consequently constrain policy before voters withdraw their support. Where delayed adjustment also leaves voters facing higher costs, producers’ responses can help produce the electoral reversal they anticipate. Modest but stable support can permit gradual progress when producers expect even limited increases in stringency to persist long enough to justify investment. Producers with lower adjustment costs then have stronger incentives to invest and withdraw from opposition. Where their adjustment lowers the costs borne by voters and weakens organised resistance, governments can sustain initial increases in stringency and pursue further changes without requiring a corresponding increase in electoral support.
The Domestic Political Economy of Net Zero
Jacob Edenhofer, Maurice Hirt, and Federica Genovese
Forthcoming · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · 2027
Abstract
Rich democracies have cut emissions considerably but unevenly across countries and sectors. Yet, their policies fall short of what net zero requires. We examine this uneven progress by distinguishing adopted from durable stringency and linking electoral and producer politics through policy credibility. Adopted policy, we argue, endures only if the vote-seeking incentives or policy-seeking motives driving it last long enough for firms to adjust while costs for voters remain diffuse. Whether these incentives or motives persist, recur, or reverse determines which of three policy trajectories emerges. Under latent electoral demand, persistent policy-seeking motives yield quiet accumulation of modest, largely durable increases. Recurrent clear activation produces punctuated accumulation of larger but only partly durable increases. Policy cycling occurs in polarised electoral environments, where government turnover deters firm adjustment. These trajectories help clarify when prominent accounts of climate policymaking hold, show how its obstacles differ across contexts, and explain why the road to net zero will likely be noisy.
How do climate institutions matter? Strategic challenges and the policy process effects of climate institutions
Claudia Zwar, Jacob Edenhofer, and Christian Flachsland
Published · Journal of European Public Policy, online first · 2026
Abstract
Climate institutions, including climate laws and advisory bodies, have proliferated globally. But do they matter? Existing work either analyses quantitatively how these institutions correlate with policy outcomes, like stringency or emissions reductions, or qualitatively examines a single type of institution. Neither strand provides tools to systematically identify, analyse, and compare the effects of these institutions on the policymaking process itself. We therefore develop a framework which provides replicable criteria to identify climate institutions and traces how institutions’ formal functions interact with country-specific moderating variables to address strategic challenges in climate policymaking. Applying the framework to qualitatively compare climate institutions in Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia, we show they support agenda-setting, increase transparency, signal commitment, and hold governments accountable. By conceptualising a new class of effects, we show how climate institutions can matter and provide a tool for comparative analysis of meso-level institutions.
Introducing the Climate Politics Framework (CPF): An Application to German Climate Policy
Jacob Edenhofer and Christian Flachsland
Working paper · OSF preprint · 2025
Abstract
This paper introduces the Climate Politics Framework (CPF), a novel and comprehensive approach to analysing climate policymaking. The CPF sets out four fundamental problems—pervasive collective action challenges, distributional dynamics, long-term policy, and deep uncertainty—that shape both elite and mass-level climate politics. These, in turn, influence the stringency and design of climate policy platforms, which consist of institutions, policy instruments, as well as framing and rhetoric. These platforms can both cause emissions reductions—the main dependent variable of interest—and address strategic challenges in the climate policy process (e.g. agenda-setting, coordination, compensation, and commitment), thereby altering political dynamics over time. Applying the CPF to Germany, based on elite interviews and a literature review, we analyse key episodes and structural features of German climate policy over the past four decades. The CPF offers both an academic contribution—by synthesising disparate strands of the climate politics literature—and, with a view to future applications, a practical tool for policymakers and stakeholders to diagnose political barriers and identify pathways for effective climate policymaking.